



Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures

Guinea

2nd Enhanced Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating

Follow-up Report



November 2025



The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) is a specialized institution of ECOWAS and a FATF Style Regional Body that promotes policies to protect member State's financial systems against money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF) standard.

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This assessment was adopted by written procedure at its November 2025 Plenary meeting.

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Republic of Guinea: Second Enhanced Follow-up Report

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Guinea's mutual evaluation report was discussed and adopted by the 40th GIABA Technical Commission/Plenary meeting in November 2023 in Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria. Guinea's first follow-up report was circulated in November 2024 for information purposes. This FUR analyses Guinea's progress in meeting the technical compliance requirements of Recommendations 28 and 34, which are subject to re-rating. A re-rating of technical compliance is granted when sufficient progress has been made.
2. Overall, countries are expected to have addressed most, if not all, technical compliance gaps by the end of the third year following the adoption of their MER. This report does not analyse Guinea's progress in terms of the effectiveness of its AML/CFT system.
3. The analysis of Guinea's request for a re-rating of Technical Compliance and the preparation of this report were carried out by expert Mamadou Ibrahim Bania, Secretary General of CENTIF-Niger.
4. The expert was assisted by Ms Yeri Miraille Stéphanie Hien and Mr Karnon Lofigué from the GIABA Secretariat.
5. Section IV of this report summarises the progress made by Guinea in improving TC. Section V presents the conclusion and a table illustrating Guinea's MER ratings and the updated ratings based on this report.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT

6. Guinea's MER ratings are as follows:

Table 1: Technical Compliance Ratings¹ , November 2023

R.	Score	R.	Note
1.	PC (MER 2023)	21.	C (MER 2023)
2.	PC (MER 2023)	22.	LC (MER 2023)
3.	C (MER 2023)	23.	LC (MER 2023)
4.	C (MER 2023)	24.	PC (MER 2023)
5.	C (MER 2023)	25.	PC (MER 2023)
6.	PC (MER 2023)	26.	LC (MER 2023)
7.	PC (MER 2023)	27.	C (MER 2023)
8.	NC (MER 2023)	28.	PC (MER 2023)
9.	C (MER 2023)	29.	LC (MER 2023)
10.	LC (MER 2023)	30.	C (MER 2023)
11.	C (MER 2023)	31.	C (MER 2023)
12.	PC (MER 2023)	32.	LC (MER 2023)

¹ Note: There are four possible levels of technical compliance: Compliant (C), Largely compliant (LC), Partially compliant (PC) and Non-compliant (NC).

13.	C (MER 2023)		33.	PC (MER 2023)
14.	PC (MER 2023)		34.	PC (MER 2023)
15.	PC (MER 2023)		35.	LC (MER 2023)
16.	LC (MER 2023)		36.	C (MER 2023)
17.	LC (MER 2023)		37.	LC (MER 2023)
18.	LC (MER 2023)		38.	LC (MER 2023)
19.	PC (MER 2023)		39.	LC (MER 2023)
20.	C (MER 2023)		40.	LC (MER 2023)

7. In light of the MER results, Guinea has been placed under enhanced follow-up.

III. OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS MADE IN IMPROVING TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE

8. In accordance with the GIABA Mutual Evaluation Process and Procedures, this FUR takes into account progress made up to 14 May 2025. In accordance with the current GIABA Mutual Evaluation Procedures and the FATF Methodology for assessing technical compliance with FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems, the review team's analysis took into account the progress made in addressing the deficiencies identified in the MER and the completeness (all criteria) of the Recommendations reviewed, noting that this is not detailed when the legal, institutional or operational framework has remained unchanged since the MER and there have been no changes to the FATF Standards or their interpretation.

9. This section summarises the progress made by Guinea to improve its Technical Compliance by addressing the deficiencies identified in this area in its MER (R. 28 and R. 34).

4.1 Progress made in addressing technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER

10. Following the adoption of the MER, the Republic of Guinea has made progress in improving its technical compliance with R. 28 and R. 34. To this end, the country established, by Decree D/2023/0045/PRG/CNRD/SGG, the Regulatory Authority for the Gaming and Related Practices Sector (RAGSRP), which is responsible for managing gaming companies and issuing operating licences. As part of its activities, this Agency adopted regulatory document 0190 bis/RAGSRP/DG/12-23 on the conditions for regulating and carrying out the activities of gaming operators on 11 December 2023. We also note the adoption of Decree A/2024/95/MSPC/CAB/SGG, which regulates the transport of cash and valuables.

11. GIABA commends the progress made by Guinea to improve its technical compliance with Recommendations 28 and 34. However, this progress is not sufficient to justify an upgrade of the rating for these Recommendations at this stage.

Recommendation 28 (initially rated PC)

12. In its second mutual evaluation report (2023), Guinea was rated PC on R.28. The following shortcomings were identified: weaknesses in AML/CFT in the casino sector and gambling establishments, due to the absence of a competent authority responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with AML/CFT/PF provisions by DNFBPs, and the absence of verification and control at the DNFBP level based on AML/CFT provisions.

13. In addition, Guinea had not provided information (in particular the texts governing the conditions of access to the profession of the respective DNFBPs) to ensure that there are requirements or measures in place to adequately prevent criminals or their associates from obtaining the status of authorised professional, or from holding a significant or controlling interest, becoming the beneficial owners of such an interest, or to hold a senior position in a designated non-financial business or profession, or to be beneficial owners of a significant or controlling interest in such DNFBPs.

14. **Criterion 28.1 [Partly Met]**

- a. **[Met]** Article 5 of Decree D/2023/0045/PRG/CNRD/SGG on the establishment, powers, organisation and functioning of the Regulatory Authority for the Gaming Sector and Related Practices (RAGSRP) stipulates that the RAGSRP is responsible for organising, regulating, supervising and controlling gambling activities, including for online casinos, and related practices.
- b. **[Partly Met]** Guinea does not have sufficient procedures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding (or being the beneficial owners of) a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function or being an operator of a casino. Article 3 of Decision 0190 bis/RAGSRP/DG/12-23, requires an applicant obtaining or renewing a licence to operate a casino to submit:
 - a commitment to establish a company under Guinean law, with at least 25% capital held by Guinean nationals, whether natural or legal persons;
 - proof of experience of the applicant company or its managers in operating a casinos and/or slot machine room;
 - copies of the passports of the managers and shareholders (natural or legal persons) of the company; and
 - criminal records of the directors of the company dating back to less than three months prior to the application. Applicants are not required to provide criminal records on their shareholders and information on their beneficial owners (BOs).
- c. **[Met]** The analysis made in the 2023 MER for Guinea remains relevant, Ref. 2nd MER (Nov. 2023).

15. **Criterion 28.2 [Met]** The analysis made in the 2023 MER for Guinea remains relevant, Ref. 2nd MER (Nov. 2023).

16. **Criterion 28.3 [Met]** The analysis made in the 2023 MER for Guinea remains relevant, Ref. 2nd MER (Nov. 2023).

17. **Criterion 28.4 [Partly met]**

- a. **[Met]** The analysis in Guinea's 2023 MER remains relevant, Ref. 2nd MER (Nov. 2023).
- b. **[Partly met]** Article 2 of Decree A/2024/95/MSPC/CAB/SGG, which regulates the transport of cash and valuables, requires a complete file including a criminal record, official approval, and character checks carried out by the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, with the possibility of international cooperation via Interpol. This framework is considered robust in limiting criminal infiltration.

However, the other deficiencies initially noted in the MER (2023) remain, namely: the weakness of the legal frameworks governing the establishment of most DNFBPs, particularly real estate companies and agents, art and antique dealers, sports agents, or trusts and company service providers, for which there is no legal text allowing for the assessment of TC with their start of operation. However, these legal loopholes expose these sectors to increased risks of ML and TF, as confirmed by the findings of the National Risk Assessment (NRA).

- c. **[Met]** The analysis carried out in the 2023 MER for Guinea Remains relevant, Ref. 2nd MER (Nov. 2023).

18. **Criterion 28.5 (a) and (b) [Met]** The FIU supervises DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements on a risk-sensitive basis (Article 98, para. 1, indent 4, Law No. 2021/0024/AN on AML/CFT). The supervision actions include (a) determining the frequency and scope of controls of DNFBPs based on its understanding of the ML/TF risks, taking into consideration the characteristics of the DNFBPs, in particular their diversity and number; and (b) taking into account the ML/TF risk profile of those DNFBPs, and the degree of discretion allowed to the FIU under the risk-based approach when assessing the adequacy of the AML/CFT internal controls, policies and procedures of DNFBPs (Arts. 23.3 and 24, Decree No. D/2022/0587/PRG/CNRD/SGG). The risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is driven by the findings of the National Risk Assessment (NRA) (which classifies the various DNFBPs into different risk categories) adopted by Decree No. A/2023/4083/ MEF/SGG of September 6, 2023, and Decision No. 011/PR/CAB of November 19, 2024 validating the DNFBP Regulation and Supervision Manual of the FIU and the Supervision Plan. The FIU periodically (twice a year) assesses the risk profile of DNFBPs and when there are major events in the management and operations of DNFBPs.

Weighting and conclusion

19. Guinea licenses casinos, including online casinos, and subjects them to AML/CFT regulation and supervision. Other DNFBPs are also subject to AML/CFT monitoring. The FIU is the AML/CFT supervisor and performs supervision of DNFBPs on a risk-sensitive basis. However, there are gaps regarding entry control measures to prevent criminals or their associates from controlling DNFBPs, particularly higher-risk sectors (dealers in precious stones and metals, real estate agents and sellers of art and antiques). Overall, in view of the country's ML/TF risk profile, these remaining shortcomings are considered moderate.

20. **On this basis, the Partially Compliant rating for R. 28 is maintained.**

Recommendation 34 (initially rated PC)

21. In its second mutual evaluation report (2023), Guinea was rated PC for Recommendation 34. The shortcomings were that, in addition to Instruction No. I/DGSIF/DSIMF/007/2018 applicable to FIs; Instruction No. 109/DGSIF/DSB; Instruction No. 110/DGSIF/DSB and Instruction No. 111/DGSIF/DSB setting thresholds for reporting, the BCRG (Central Bank) had not demonstrated that it produced guidelines to assist FIs in implementing national AML/CFT measures and, in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions. Similarly, the FIU, the regulator and supervisor of all DNFBPs, had not issued guidelines to all DNFBPs. It had published information on its website on the AML/CFT obligations to assist reporting entities, reminding them of their obligations in terms of customer due diligence, reporting of suspicious transactions, record keeping and the establishment of an internal AML/CFT system, as well as the reporting form.

22. With regard to feedback, although the BCRG had published Law No. 2021/0024/AN on AML/CFT on its website, the country had not established a feedback mechanism or organised awareness-raising/training meetings for FIs on their AML/CFT obligations. Overall, the information provided by the country did not allow for an assessment of compliance with the requirements of this criterion.

23. **Criterion 34.1 [Partly Met]**

1. Guidelines and instructions

a. Financial Institutions

The legal, institutional and operational framework has not changed since the adoption of the MER.

b. DNFBP

The FIU, in its capacity as the regulatory and supervisory authority for DNFBPs, has developed two (2) guidelines, which were approved by the President on 28 April 2025 and initially disseminated during meetings to raise awareness of the AML/CFT law and then on the FIU website on 6 May 2025.

The first document is entitled "Guidance implementing AML/CFT obligations in the Republic of Guinea" and the second document is entitled "Indicators of suspicious transactions for the attention of non-financial sector entities, in particular DNFBPs". These guidelines include detailed information on risk assessment, due diligence obligations, reporting and information obligations. However, the general nature of these guidelines does not allow for the specific characteristics of each category of DNFBPs to be taken into account, particularly those that are most at risk.

2. Feedback

a. Financial institutions

The FIU provided feedback to regulated professionals in the financial sector on the findings of its analysis and processing of suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

b. However, Guinea has not provided any evidence of feedback from the BCRG to FIs, particularly regarding the findings of its on-site inspections.

DNFBP

Guinea did not provide information confirming that it had provided feedback to the DNFBPs regarding their implementation of AML/CFT measures, particularly with regard to the reporting of suspicious transactions.

Weighting and conclusion

24. Guidelines on implementing AML/CFT measures and detection of suspicious transactions have been published for DNFBPs and are available on the FIU's website. However, these guidelines are general in nature and are not tailored to the specific needs of different sectors.

25. Furthermore, no guidelines have been published for FIs. In addition, FIU provides feedback to regulated professionals in the financial sector on the results of its analysis and processing of STRs. These shortcomings constitute moderate shortcomings in the context of Guinea.

26. **On this basis, the Partially Compliant rating for R. 34 is maintained.**

V. CONCLUSION

27. Overall, the progress made is not sufficient to justify a re-rating of Recommendations 28 and 34.

28. Table 2 below presents the ratings for the MER of Guinea and reflects the progress made by the country up to 14 May 2025, including the rating based on this report:

Table 2. Technical Compliance Ratings (May 2025)

R.	Rating	R.	Rating
1.	PC (MER 2023)	21.	C (MER 2023)
2.	PC (MER 2023)	22.	LC (MER 2023)
3.	C (MER 2023)	23.	LC (MER 2023)
4.	C (MER 2023)	24.	PC (MER 2023)
5.	C (MER 2023)	25.	PC (MER 2023)
6.	PC (MER 2023)	26.	LC (MER 2023)
7.	PC (MER 2023)	27.	C (MER 2023)
8.	NC (MER 2023)	28.	PC (MER 2023)↔ PC (FUR 2025)
9.	C (MER 2023)	29.	LC (MER 2023)
10.	LC (MER 2023)	30.	C (MER 2023)
11.	C (MER 2023)	31.	C (MER 2023)
12.	PC (MER 2023)	32.	LC (MER 2023)
13.	C (MER 2023)	33.	PC (MER 2023)
14.	PC (MER 2023)	34.	PC (MER 2023)↔ PC (FUR 2025)
15.	PC (MER 2023)	35.	LC (MER 2023)
16.	LC (MER 2023)	36.	C (MER 2023)
17.	LC (MER 2023)	37.	LC (MER 2023)
18.	LC (MER 2023)	38.	LC (MER 2023)
19.	PC (MER 2023)	39.	LC (MER 2023)
20.	C (MER 2023)	40.	LC (MER 2023)

29. Guinea has 26 Recommendations rated C/LC. Guinea will remain under enhanced follow-up based on its effectiveness ratings. Guinea's next enhanced FUR is scheduled for November 2026.

Appendix to the FUR

Summary of Technical Compliance - Deficiencies leading to ratings

Recommendations	Rating	Factor(s) underlying the rating
1. Risk assessment and application of a risk-based approach	[PC]	- Moderate shortcomings relating to the lack of consistency, comprehensiveness and relevance of the NRA findings. In addition, the country has not defined mechanisms to disseminate the NRA results to AML/CFT stakeholders. - The lack of an action plan with risk-based resource allocation limits the country's response to the requirements of this Recommendation.
2. National cooperation and coordination	[PC]	- Incomplete legislative framework for domestic cooperation and coordination - The country also lacks national AML/CFT policies and any framework for domestic cooperation involving AML/CFT stakeholders. Furthermore, although there is a legislative and regulatory framework that ensures data protection and privacy, there is no mechanism in place to ensure that AML/CFT and cybersecurity stakeholders cooperate and coordinate in line with the requirements of this criterion. The deficiencies identified in relation to this Recommendation are moderate.
3. Money laundering offences	[C]	Guinea's legal framework for criminalising ML complies with the requirements of R.3.
4. Confiscation and preventive measures	[C]	Guinea's legislative and regulatory framework for seizure and confiscation fully complies with the requirements of R.4.
5. Terrorist financing offence	[C]	Terrorist financing is punishable in Guinea, even if the terrorist acts have occurred or will occur in another country, or even if the terrorists or terrorist organisations are located abroad.
6. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing	[PC]	- Moderate deficiencies identified in the implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and its financing. - Guinea has established a National Advisory Commission on Administrative Freezing (NACAF) and designated an authority responsible for proposing designations to the 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees, as well as under UNSCR 1373, and has stated that TFS will be implemented without delay, but it has not put in place sufficient procedures and mechanisms, particularly with regard to identifying individuals and entities that meet the criteria for designation on reasonable grounds, delisting and unfreezing the funds and other assets of designated individuals and entities. - Guinea has provided for the prompt notification of administrative freezing decisions, but has not developed guidelines for the effective implementation of these decisions by FIs and DNFBPs.
7. Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation	[PC]	- There are moderate gaps in Guinea's legal framework for the application of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing in light of the country's risk and context. - Although Guinean legislation provides for the implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing, its prompt implementation is hampered by the lack of appropriate mechanisms and procedures for the prompt notification of freezing decisions to FIs and DNFBPs.
8. Non-profit organisations	[NC]	There are major gaps related to the lack of identification of subsets of NPOs that are likely to be exploited for terrorist financing purposes, awareness-raising and

Recommendations	Rating	Factor(s) underlying the rating
		education of NPOs on TF issues, risk-based AML/TF monitoring or control of NPOs in relation to the country's risk profile; mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with a view to exchanging information on NPOs, and appropriate procedures for responding to international requests concerning NPOs suspected of TF.
9. Financial Institutions Secrecy Laws	[C]	Guinea's AML/CFT legal framework has no shortcomings with regard to the requirements of this recommendation.
10. Customer due diligence	[LC]	- Guinea's AML/CFT legal framework takes into account the legal requirements of Recommendation 10 to a very large extent. However, some minor shortcomings have been identified. - The country makes no mention of the obligation to obtain reliable information on beneficial owners where they are identified by particular characteristics or categories (see footnote 37 relating to sub-criterion 10.11). - The provisions of Article 28.b of the AML/CFT Law do not specify that this legal obligation on FIs applies in cases where the beneficiaries are identified by characteristics or category or by other means. - No legal text lists the simplified due diligence measures in relation to the ongoing or normal due diligence measures that FIs are required to implement. At least, Instruction 109 of the Governor of the Central Bank on the procedures for the application by FIs of the AML/CFT law does not meet this requirement.
11. Record keeping	[C]	Guinea's AML/CFT framework provides a comprehensive legal basis for the requirements of this Recommendation. Indeed, no gaps have been identified in its texts with regard to document retention.
12. Politically exposed persons	[PC]	- Guinea has a solid legal basis with regard to the requirements of this recommendation. However, this legal framework only covers family members of two categories of domestic PEPs. - The exclusion of family members of several categories of PEPs from the scope of specific enhanced due diligence measures applicable to PEPs could adversely affect the effectiveness of these measures. This shortcoming is considered moderate in view of the country's socio-economic context, which is characterised by a high level of corruption and embezzlement of public funds.
13. Correspondent Banking	[C]	Guinea's AML/CFT framework provides a comprehensive legal basis for the requirements of this recommendation.
14. Money or value transfer services	[PC]	Guinea's AML/CFT framework provides an essential legal basis for regulating money or value transfer services in line with FATF requirements. However, there are moderate deficiencies, in particular, no measures or mechanisms have been put in place to identify natural or legal persons who carry out this activity illegally.
15. New technologies	[PC]	- Guinea's legal framework does not include provisions for the identification and/or registration of VASPs or for the assessment of ML/TF risks arising from activities related to VAs and the activities or operations of VASPs, in accordance with a risk-based approach. - Similarly, the shortcomings relating to criterion 15.4.b, 15.9.ii, 15.9.iii and 15.10 constitute moderate deficiencies in relation to the requirements of this recommendation.
16. Wire transfers	[LC]	Except for the deficiencies related to the implementation of TFSs, the Guinean legal framework largely meets the requirements of Recommendation 16.

Recommendations	Rating	Factor(s) underlying the rating
17. Reliance on third parties	[LC]	Guinea's legal framework is satisfactory with regard to the requirements contained in this recommendation. However, the procedures for implementing these specific and enhanced measures to prevent ML/TF have not been established.
18. Internal controls, foreign branches and subsidiaries	[LC]	- Guinean legislation covers most of the requirements for internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries. However, Guinea's current legislation does not contain any provisions requiring Guinean financial groups to implement the specific requirements set out in point C.18.3. - Due to the absence of Guinean financial groups with foreign branches and subsidiaries, the deficiencies are considered minor.
19. Higher-risk countries	[PC]	There are no measures in place to inform FIs of concerns arising from deficiencies in other countries' AML/CFT regimes. The countermeasures referred to in the law have not yet been determined.
20. Reporting of suspicious transactions	[C]	- Guinea's legal framework does require financial institutions to immediately report suspicious transactions to FIU under the conditions described in the standards, including attempted suspicious transactions. - In addition, Guinea has transmitted the FIU guidelines on the conditions and procedures for transmitting STRs referred to in Article 87 of the AML/CFT Law, the procedures for analysing and processing STRs, and the STR reporting form.
21. Tipping-off and confidentiality	[C]	Guinea has a solid legal framework with regard to the requirements of R.21.
22. Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions: customer due diligence	[LC]	Guinea's legal framework largely incorporates the requirements of Recommendation 22. However, the shortcomings of certain provisions of the AML/CFT Law in relation to Recommendations 10, 12 and 17 also apply to this Recommendation.
23. Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions: other measures	[LC]	- Although Guinea's legal framework has made significant progress with regard to the requirements of R.23, minor shortcomings identified under R. 18 and 19 need to be addressed.
24. Transparency and beneficial owners of legal persons	[PC]	- Guinea's legal framework enshrines the general principle of transparency for legal persons and beneficial owners, but it has numerous shortcomings. - Guinea has not identified or assessed, in any way, the ML/TF risks associated with commercial legal entities, associations and foundations. - The country does not have an integrated system for the information held by the APIP and the Commercial Court to update the RCCM information in a timely manner, let alone mechanisms for updating the information on beneficial owners collected and stored in the company register. - Nor are there any legal or regulatory provisions requiring the country to monitor the quality of the assistance it receives from other countries in response to requests for basic information and information on beneficial owners, or requests for assistance in locating beneficial owners residing abroad.
25. Transparency and beneficial owners of legal arrangements	[PC]	- In Guinea, there is no legal obligation for professional trustees to retain the information they collect, let alone for a period of five years after their involvement in the trust has ceased. - There is no explicit legal framework requiring trusts to declare their status to FIs or DNFBPs at the time of the business relationship. However, the legal framework provides that trusts are legally liable for any breach of their obligations, or that they are subject to proportionate and dissuasive penalties, whether criminal, civil or administrative, applicable in the event of non-compliance with their obligations.
26. Regulation and	[LC]	Guinea has designated the BCRG as the supervisory authority for FIs. The

Recommendations	Rating	Factor(s) underlying the rating
supervision of financial institutions		identification of the beneficial owners of FIs and the risk-based approach to ML/TF are taken into account in the supervision or control of FIs. With the exception of money and securities transfer companies, the regulatory provisions relating to the verification of the good repute of directors and the identification of beneficial owners apply to all FIs. Similarly, there are no specific requirements to review the assessment of the non-compliance risk profile of an FI or financial group on a regular basis.
27. Powers of supervisors	[C]	Guinea's legal framework has no shortcomings with regard to the requirements of this recommendation.
28. Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs	[PC] PC (FUR 2025)	- No significant progress has been made in strengthening the legal framework for controlling the entry of DNFBPs into business. - Weak legal frameworks for controlling the entry of most DNFBPs into business.
29. Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)	[LC]	In general, Guinea has a legal framework that incorporates the requirements of Recommendation 29. However, there is no evidence of its application for membership of the Egmont Group (EG), let alone a document detailing the reforms it has implemented with a view to accelerating its accession to the EG.
30. Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities	[C]	Guinea's legal and institutional framework meets the criteria of this recommendation.
31. Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities	[C]	Guinea has taken all necessary measures to comply with the requirements of this Recommendation.
32. Cash couriers	[LC]	The adoption of Law No. 2021-0024 on AML/CFT on 17 August 2021 enabled Guinea to correct the legal limitations related to the physical transport of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). Declarations on entry and exit are now mandatory. However, the information collected by the customs services in the context of controls on the cross-border transport of cash and bearer negotiable instruments is only transmitted at the request of the competent authorities.
33. Statistics	[PC]	FIU periodically compiles comprehensive statistics on STRs received and disseminated. However, there is a lack of comprehensive and periodic statistics on investigations, prosecutions and convictions, frozen, seized and confiscated assets, mutual legal assistance and other international requests for cooperation made and received in relation to AML/CFT, as required by the AML/CFT law.
34. Guidelines and feedback	[PC] PC (FUR 2025)	- The guidelines established for DNFBPs are general in nature and do not cover their specific needs. - No feedback is provided to DNFBPs. - No guidelines have been developed for FIs.
35. Sanctions	[LC]	Guinea's AML/CFT legal framework provides for the BCRG and FIU, as the supervisory authorities for FIs and DNFBPs respectively, to apply administrative and disciplinary sanctions against FIs, DNFBPs and their managers who fail to comply with AML/CFT obligations. However, the absence of specific administrative sanctions for NPOs relating to AML obligations constitutes a minor shortcoming in the implementation of preventive measures, given the country's context and risks.
36. International instruments	[C]	Guinea is a party to the Vienna, Palermo and Mérida Conventions and the Convention on the Financing of Terrorism. The country has fully implemented these international instruments by adopting legislation and regulations. All offences covered by these legal instruments have been criminalised.
37. Mutual legal assistance	[LC]	Guinea's legal and institutional framework enables it to provide the widest

Recommendations	Rating	Factor(s) underlying the rating
		possible range of mutual legal assistance. There is a designated central authority responsible for mutual legal assistance. • However, there are no procedures for prioritising and expediting the execution of requests for mutual assistance received. • No adequate system for monitoring the processing of mutual assistance requests has been put in place. • There is no express provision clarifying that double criminality, where required, does not apply when the request does not involve coercive measures.
38. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation	[LC]	• Guinea has a legal and institutional framework that gives the competent authorities broad powers to take appropriate action in a timely manner in response to requests from foreign countries to locate, identify and bring to justice the proceeds of crime with a view to their confiscation. This framework allows for assistance to be provided when a request for assistance is based on confiscation procedures without prior conviction in circumstances where the perpetrator of the offence is deceased, on the run, absent or unknown. • However, Guinea has not concluded any agreements with other States to coordinate seizure, freezing and confiscation actions or to dispose of confiscated property. • Nor is there any mechanism in place to manage frozen or seized property or property that has been confiscated and, where necessary, to dispose of it.
39. Extradition	[LC]	• Guinea's legal and institutional framework enables it to execute without undue delay extradition requests received from foreign countries concerning persons convicted of ML/TF offences or associated predicate offences. There are clear procedures for the execution of extradition requests. • However, there is no system for managing files or prioritising requests. Nevertheless, the law provides for a simplified extradition procedure allowing the requesting State to address its request directly to the competent judicial authority in Guinea.
40. Other forms of international cooperation	[LC]	• There is no legal provision requiring supervisory authorities to obtain prior authorisation from their foreign counterparts before using information obtained from them for supervisory or other purposes. • Guinea has also not established effective mechanisms or channels to facilitate and enable direct, rapid and constructive exchanges of information between non-counterpart authorities.



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November 2025

**Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures in Guinea**

Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating

**The report also examines whether Guinea measures
meet the requirements of the FATF
Recommendations that have changed since their
Mutual Evaluation in 2023.**

Follow-up Report